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Abstract
This work is divided in two parts. A first part concentrates on the evalu-
ation of the forecast accuracy of around 50 agencies respective the forecasts
of UK GDP growth rates in the last eleven years. For this goal, around 130
publications of “Forecasts for the UK economy” from the HM treasury were
assembled in order to construct a usable data set. The individual forecasts
are then used in a second part to generate combined forecasts according
to the forecast combination literature. Different combination schemes are
applied and compared with each other. The findings mainly confirm the
evidence of comparable empirical studies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In late 2008 the year-ahead forecasts for the UK economic growth rate started
to drop as in most other globalised countries. As a matter of fact, in summer
2008 the forecasts for the year-ahead GDP growth were still around two per-
cent. Already in October growth forecasts turned negative and at year-end
some forecasting agencies published figures of -2.5%. This trend continued
in 20091 to forecasts of almost -5%. This includes only serious forecasting
agencies. In the media however, figures of -6% and even -7% were published.
For people who do not follow forecasts on a regular basis this crisis-caused
media attention may have sounded more like a competition of “who’s got
the worse forecast”. By witnessing this sequence of events the idea for this
work was born.
The aim of this study is to have a closer look on the forecast figures
and behaviour of the different agencies who engage in macro economic fore-
casting. The fact that there is almost never a comparison between these
published figures and the true outturn underlines the need for a more sys-
tematic approach. This work shall contribute to the satisfaction of this need.
The importance of this work becomes even clearer when realising that
the forecast of this main economic variable2 provides the basis for economic
1for the current-year forecast, i.e. done in 2009 for 2009
2This work only looks at GDP. Other main indicators are the inflation rate and em-
ployment. Further analysis on the other variables may follow.
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decision-making in almost any field. For instance, a company has to decide on
a certain investment. The present value analysis which discounts future flows
of funds offers major help for the decision finding. It is the economic outlook,
mostly in form of a growth forecast, that heavily influences the underlying
discount rates. Another quite instructive example is that the state estimates
its future tax revenues on the basis of the growth indicators. Thus the
economic forecasts severely influence the government budget planning.
Similar work3 on this field was done before but never in this detail and
mostly as a yearly “snapshot”, in which a very good accuracy performance
of a so-called “one-timer” and an agency who simply has a superior model
cannot be distinguished. Also it combines different economic variables into
one performance index. This influences the conclusiveness.
This work analyses real GDP growth forecasts from 1997 until 2008 pro-
vided by the UK government. UK was chosen as the country of analysis for
the simple reason of data availability. The interesting year of 2009 is not yet
analysable since reliable GDP data for 2009 still have to be confirmed.
Chapter 2 introduces the terminology of the forecast error which is the
main unit for the evaluation of the forecast accuracy. It explains more on
data collection and data processing as well as how forecasters produce their
figures. It also tells about the different strategies forecasters might follow and
what kind of target function could be in use. Chapter 3 analyses the data
on an aggregate level and provides a summary statistics. In chapter 4 the
different possibilities to measures forecast errors are explained and applied
to the dataset. The detailed evaluation of individual forecasters is also part
of this chapter. The combination of forecasts with its aim of deriving a more
precise and more reliable forecast is discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
3An economic journalist of the Sunday Times publishes a yearly compilation of the
best forecasters. See figure 9.1 on page 67 in the appendix of this work.
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Chapter 2
The data
Starting with a definition of the forecast error in the first section, the second
section deals with the collection of the forecast data. Finally, section three
explains where the eventuated figures, i.e. the realised data, was taken from
and how it was processed. As a reminder, this work takes only the growth
rate of the real UK gross domestic product into account. Further analyses
of other variables are possible but would blast the limits of this work.
2.1 Definition of forecast error
The forecast error is defined as the difference between the actual realisation
of the variable in question and the forecast of that variable, as shown in
equation 2.1.
Forecast Error = Actuals - Forecasts (2.1)
The forecast error is the basic unit with which the forecasters’ accuracy
and therefore their performance can be measured. In some publications you
may find that the forecast error is defined the other way around. But this
should not bother too much since the main error measures either square the
value or take the absolute value from it.
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Whereas the collection of the forecasts in the next section is laborious
but straight forward, the not so trivial point to be discussed in section 2.3
is which actuals to use. But more on that later on.
2.2 The forecasts
2.2.1 Source
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), the UK public finance department, provides
at its homepage 1 a monthly publication called “Forecasts for the UK econ-
omy - a comparison of independent forecasts”, where it publishes monthly
forecasts from around 40 different agencies who engage in forecasting. The
publication’s main part consists of six tables. The first three report the
forecasters’ current-year forecast, whereas the tables 4, 5 and 6 display the
year-ahead forecast. In other words, for every year - with the exception of
1998 - 24 monthly forecasts are published for a broad range of variables.
The forecasts are restricted to the UK economy and can be divided into
three main parts: forecasts of GDP and its components, forecasts of prices
and forecasts of “other selected variables” like employment. Furthermore,
it divides the forecasters into two groups. The first group is called “City
forecasters”and the other one “Non-City forecasters”. City forecasters are
mainly international banks (e.g. Citigroup or UBS) and investment firms
(e.g. Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley). Non-City forecasters can be de-
scribed as mostly UK-based research institutes (e.g. Cambridge Economet-
rics or IHS Global Insight) and international organisations (e.g. EC, IMF
or OECD). The HMT sends out a monthly questionnaire to collect the data
from the different agencies. A full list of agencies (see figure 9.9) who take
part in today’s publication is listed in the appendix.
This work considers only the forecasts for the growth rates of real UK
GDP, which can be found in the first column of table 1 and 4 of each pub-
lication. In total there are 135 monthly publications, which translate into
1http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data forecasts index.htm
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an observed time period of more than 11 years, starting in September 1997
until December 2008.
It should be noted that HMT publishes a medium-term forecast every
three months. This forecast comprises two, three and four year-ahead fore-
casts. Those mid-term estimations are not considered in this study, since it
is common opinion that only this-year’s and the next-year´s forecasts are of
public interest. The forecasts that go beyond that time frame are way too
imprecise to rely on.
2.2.2 Data collection
The collection of the data is organized by the HMT. It described the data col-
lection process in the following way. A questionnaire is sent out to forecasters
on the first working day of every month. Then on the second Wednesday
of each month the forecasters are reminded to fill in their questionnaire,
since the deadline is always the second Thursday of each month. If some of
the forecasters do not return their questionnaire on time, then the previous
month’s figures are taken again, but noted that this particular forecast was
produced in a previous month. For instance, if a certain forecaster does not
compile the questionnaire by the second Thursday in November, then the
October values become published again and marked by a “ * ”. If there was
no forecast in October either, then the September forecast is used again and
so on. In the case that a forecaster did not update for more than 5 months2,
it will be temporarily taken out of the list until a new forecast is received.
2.2.3 Forecast updating
It is quite unrealistic to believe that every forecaster is updating their data
every month or that they always return the survey questionnaire to the
HMT back on time. For this reason every data point does not have the same
quality. For example, HMT indicates that a forecast is not from a certain
month by always displaying the month the figures were originally produced.
2with the exception of OECD, who publishes its numbers only twice a year
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However, in this work no difference was made between a new forecast
and one that is already a couple of months old. There is a reason at hand:
simplicity. A further reason is that the dataset would shrink to about two
thirds of its original size. But since the superior aim of this work is to find
out which of those forecasters are good ones, the inclusion of all data points
can be justified in the following way. Compared to those who update their
figures just a couple of times per year, the ones who update their data more
often should have an advantage for the simple reason that they are more
up-to-date.3 Thus, it comes naturally to leave all data points in the dataset,
since by doing so the recentness of the forecast is taken into account when
the performance of an agency is calculated.
This fact can be seen by looking at figure 3.2. It shows that versus the
end of almost every 24-month forecasting period the average of the fore-
casts converge to the actual outcome. Hence, by updating only from time
to time a six months-ahead forecast might for instance be taken also as the
two months-ahead which on average should decrease the forecaster’s perfor-
mance. In a way, this mechanism works as a “punisher” for not updating on
a regular, i.e. monthly basis.
2.2.4 Forecasters
In these 12 years of observation, 87 different agencies were listed as forecast-
ers. This number was finally reduced to 51 forecasters who remained in the
panel. The reason for these reductions is that a couple of agencies changed
their name, or were taken over by another firm who previously did not en-
gage in forecasting. As long as it could be assured that a change in name
was just due to mergers or acquisitions, the two series were merged to one
while keeping the latter name. Problems could hide here, since it cannot be
assured that the forecasts were done by the very same people or very same
models run by those people. Finally, a total of 43 forecasters was merged to
19, who then remained in the sample. Another 12 were cancelled because
they showed up only for a very short period of time.
3Or don’t you look up the most recent publication if you have five to decide from?
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2.2.5 City vs. non-city forecasters
Batchelor [5] refers to the point that at least governments and multinational
agencies should be more accurate than private sector banks or business cor-
porations, just because they have a timelier and complete knowledge of the
official statistics. Moreover they have “some insight into their own inten-
tions and likely reactions to future events”. But on the other hand, those
are subject to political pressure.
In a similar consideration, the difference between research institutes and
private sector agencies is a priori hard to tell. On the one hand, researchers
might be more accurate just because one could think that is one of their
their core competencies. But on the other hand, private companies do much
more depend on their in-house analysts for the simple reason that a lot of
money depends on their solid assessment.
2.2.6 Forecasters’ target function
What should also be kept in mind is that it is not every agency’s aim to
forecast the true value. For instance, some forecasters could try to engage
in the so-called strategic forecasting. This means that a forecaster just may
want to maximize publicity by publishing extreme forecasts. So the centre of
attention is to get quoted in the media instead of doing a “good job”. This
can often happen just because very few people are actually checking their
statements about the future developments of the economy. It is actually this
work’s aim to contribute to a reduction of this deficiency. So, knowing that,
the forecasting agencies can - without any control mechanisms - announce
the figures they think are suiting them best. Expressed in a very insinuating
way, it could be argued that announcing extreme forecasts is a low-budget
possibility of advertising.
Having said that, their behaviour can also be understood, in a sense
that if they hide in the crowd, nobody is listening to them. Thus on the
other hand, it can be argued that they are engaging in just plain product
10
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differentiation4.
Another reason for announcing “extreme” forecasts could be that some
forecasters want to provide an upper or lower bound to the variables in
question. In some cases, this is also a very useful and important informa-
tion. Just imagine, some company is deciding about an investment and the
question is whether or not to carry it out. By running worst-case and best-
case scenarios which may base on aforementioned upper or lower bounds of
the forecast distribution the people in charge have additional information at
hand for their decision-making.
A further reason why forecasters may diverge from their true belief is
that they are closely related to a governmental institution or even a political
party. In this case they might follow a strategy of backing policies which are
favoured by their political ties.
Another way to think about this issue is that some forecaster, presumably
mainly investment banks, do indeed have the “close-to-perfection” model.
But obviously they do not want to inform the public about it since they are
going to use this information advantage and try to turn it into real money;
like in the old saying “If you’re so smart, why ain’t you rich?”
A last reason why some forecasters either underestimate or overestimate
repeatedly the true outcome may just be traced back to a very pessimistic
or optimistic person in charge of the forecast.
As it will be shown later, at least one agency in this panel is very likely
to engage in one of those strategies, just because it really must be very hard
to constantly deliver bad results.
Finally, a last point must not be missing. Even if the target function is
not expanded by some of the before-mentioned strategies, other influences
can alter the outcome of a forecast. For instance, the forecasting agencies
may influence each other. The extent of this factor might actually be quite
strong since the interval of updating their beliefs is with one month quite
short. Put differently, everybody knows the beliefs5 of the others. This fact
4see Ashiya [4]
5although not the underlying target function
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has quite strong implications for the possibility of a systemic failure. The
more a forecaster is influenced no matter with or without its awareness, the
higher the possibility of collectively drifting away from a best possible guess.
In addition to that, there is a free-rider problem which may increase
the above effect. Just imagine the following situation. The person or the
group of people who are running the forecasts are for some reason, e.g. heavy
workload, not able to do a monthly “honest” update. They could be tempted
to take their last month’s update and just “adapt” it to their competitors’
opinion of last month plus some recent information. Even the word “honest”
here, may be interpreted differently.
2.3 The actuals
2.3.1 The problematic nature of actuals
In order to check the forecasters’ accuracy we need to match the individual
forecasts with the actual outcome of the variable. But already at this point
the first problem arises, which - if not taken proper care of - may alter the
results considerably or even make them useless.
As Batchelor [5] points out, a “problem to be resolved is what data to
use to measure the actual or realized value of the forecast variables. This
is less trivial than it might seem. Initial estimates of real GDP growth,
for example, are often revised several times within the following year, and
further revisions may occur years later as the GDP index is re-based.” And
then he refers to the work of Zarnowitz and Brown [23] from 1992. They
suggest taking the value of the variables which are published in August of
the following year as actuals. They motivate their view with the reason that
on the one hand very early numbers are “too unreliable”, whereas on the
other hand later data may be subject to re-basing and redefinitions which
should not at all enter the judgement of a forecaster’s performance. So the
conventional view evolved that “forecasters are judged by their ability to
predict the values of variables as they appear in the middle of the following
12
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year”6.
2.3.2 The actual actuals
The data, from which the actuals were derived, was taken from three dif-
ferent sources. The first is the IMF spring publication of its series “World
Economic Outlook” [1], which is usually published in April or May of each
year. As more data become confirmed or revised during the course of the
year, the September edition of IMF’s “World Economic Outlook” provides
also usable actuals. According to a widespread opinion in the literature, see
subsection 2.3.1 above, the actuals published in the second part of the year
may reflect the best counterpart to the forecasts since on the one hand al-
ready six months of ongoing data revision past, and on the other hand these
revisions are still close in a timely meaning to the forecasted year.
Figure 2.1: UK real GDP growth: the actuals
Figure 2.1 shows in a direct comparison the difference of the actuals
between the April/May publication of the IMF’s “World Economic Outlook”
and the September/October issue. It is easy to see that just within those
6see Batchelor [5]
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six months the actuals differ in most years around one tenth of a percentage
point. The biggest difference amounts to full 1.2 percentage points over a
period of eight years. But here, keep in mind that this must not necessarily
be due to revisions or rebasings of the GDP data, but it might also be the
case that the GDP was measured in a slightly different way.
In this work, the conventional view of Zarnowitz and Brown [23] is fol-
lowed, which means that the IMF autumn value of each year is used as the
actuals the individual forecasts are compared with.
Further actuals were taken from the today’s version of the UK’s National
Statistical Office. These actuals are used in the lower panel of figure 3.1 but
just to show the effect of using “false” actuals.
14
Chapter 3
Data analysis
3.1 Overview of the data - “the blur”
The figure 3.1 on page 17 was given the name “the blur”. A revealing
overview of the data used in this study is provided with the help of this kind
of presentation, it just needs some explanation1.
The figure 3.1 measures the forecast errors of all forecasters for real GDP
growth in the UK economy. Every panel consists of 11 years of covered
forecast errors. 1998 only shows 15 months of forecast errors, whereas all
the other years reflect the usual 24 months of forecasts: 12 for the year-ahead
and other 12 for the current-year forecasts. The 51 individual agencies are
listed in the rows.
A dark red dot corresponds to a forecast error of −3 percentage points.
A dark blue dot corresponds to a forecast error of +4 percentage points.
These two values are in fact the lower and the upper bound of all forecast
errors available in the observed period of time. A bright yellow dot stands
for a forecast error of 0 what would be a perfect match. White dots mark
missing data. It consists of 13005 pixels where each pixel represents a single
forecast error.2
1In fact the figure was produced by zooming out of the data containing Excel sheet
which was conditionally formatted before.
251 forecasters times ten years with 24 month and one year with 15 month yields 13005
15
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The figure consists of three parts. Every part reflects a different set of
underlying actuals. As mentioned above already, three different actuals were
taken into account: the IMF spring revision is in the upper panel, the IMF
autumn revision in the middle panel and in the lower panel are the forecast
errors which were derived with the data from the UK’s National Statistical
Office.
3.2 Analysing the data
For now, let us consider only the panel in the middle, which corresponds to
the above explained convention on actuals. The very big advantage of this
kind of presentation is that certain findings can be found at a glance.
• In the years 1999 and 2000 there is the biggest accumulation of blue
points. This means that the forecast errors were around its upper
bound of 4 percentage points in this period. Thus, the actuals were
much higher than foreseen by almost all of the forecasters. In other
words, the strength of the economy was underestimated. A possible
explanation for that could be that most analysts expected a recession
due to the burst of the dotcom bubble. Since “only” the IT sector
and the stock markets were affected badly, but did not influence the
real economy whose pace is measured in the growth of real GDP, the
actuals in this period did not really drop. So a recession was expected
but the real economy did actually quite good, hence a high positive
forecast error.
• The largest accumulation of red dots can be found - not really sur-
prisingly - in the year of 2008. That means that especially in the
year-ahead forecast for 2008 the forecast errors were around -3. This
corresponds to the fact that the actuals were much lower than most
forecasters did predict. This is straight forward since “nobody saw it
coming”. Hence, the expected outcome of the real economy was quite
severely overrated.
colour-coded data points.
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• The more abrupt a colour change, the more the forecasters were sur-
prised by the development of the economy. Again, this can best be
seen between the years 2007 and 2008.
• A vertical comparison of the forecast errors shows that in almost all of
the times almost all forecasters predict values that are very similar to
each other. (There is one severe outlier, but more on that later.) This
“herding effect” can be easily explained by the fact that all forecasters
use the “same” set of information. Put differently, the systematic risk
of all forecasters being wrong is quite substantial.
• Versus the end of all 24-month periods, the dots turn yellow. This
corresponds to the fact that versus the end of each year a lot of in-
formation is available. Thus, surprises may affect the yearly actual
growth rate only by a minor extent, and the forecast errors converge
against zero.
These findings are in line with that what was expected. Two other find-
ings can not be easily explained, or better, not be explained at all.
• There is a severe outlier. This is indicated by the mostly blue colour-
coded horizontal line which can be found between the first and the
second third of each panel. Two things are striking. Firstly, this
forecaster is always around two to three percentage points below “the
herd”. This makes this forecaster a pessimist; always betting that the
economy is doing worse than it actually turns out. Or put differently,
they are in constant fear of a bad surprise. And secondly, how can this
forecaster constantly be below the average? There might be two expla-
nations for this. It could be that this forecaster never learns from the
mistakes done before. But on the other hand these two characteristics
suggest that the forecaster is not more or less informed than the rest,
just that they engage in a certain strategy as we pointed out during
the introduction of the forecasters earlier in this section.
• From the year 2002 onwards, a missing data points from horizontal
white lines. This has to do with the fact that mostly in January and
18
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February the HMT is reporting the year-behind forecast. In other
words they report for instance in January 2003 again forecasts for 2000
instead of forecasting the year 2003. A reason might be, that a first
publication of the actuals for 2002 still were not produced in January
2003.
Until here, the focus was on the panel in the middle. Let us now compare
the three panels to each other. Again, the difference between the three is
the underlying actuals used to calculate the forecast errors.
• Between the first and the second panel no visual differences can be
found. As a matter of fact, those two just differ at maximum from
each other for a tenth of a percentage point, which can be seen again
in table 2.1.
• A visual difference exists between the first two and the third panel.
From 1998 until 2003 the area is in terms of the colour-code more
bluish. Or, put differently, it has a higher positive forecast error than
the rest of the years. This could plausibly reflect the above mentioned
fact that from today’s view on the UK NSO statistic, the 1998 to
2003 forecasts were re-based or redefined in order to make them more
comparable to the ones of today. It would be foolish to think that the
forecasts on average were biased downwards.
As a matter of fact, the actuals taken from the UK NSO can actually
not be applied at all, since one would neglect that every year has
undergone a different amount of revisions. That means that the year
2008 has undergone - let us assume - four revisions till today which
may or may not have been substantial (smaller then 0.1 percentage
points). But the year 2000 was - again let us assume - subject to 12
revisions and its value may be changed for more than a full percentage
point, not to forget possible rebasings or redefinitions.
So from now on, the study only uses the IMF Autumn actuals to measure
forecast errors.
19
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3.3 Statistical summary: mean and standard
deviation
Figure 3.2 will provide more detailed information about the panel of fore-
casters in aggregate. The 11 graphs in this figure show for each year from
1998 to 2008 the month-to-month evolution of the most important summary
measures: the sample mean and the sample standard deviation. The sample
median was not shown since it was always closely overlapping with the mean.
Figure 3.2: Mean ± one standard deviation
The horizontal axis in these graphs represents the chronological progres-
sion of the 12 months of year-ahead forecasts as well as the 12 months of
current-year forecasts. The axis is labelled in reverse order since the month
20
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number 24 stands for 24 months to go - more precisely 23 and half a months
to go - until the year which is forecast has past. For instance, month 24 in
the 2007 graph represents January 2006, the month in which the first 2007
forecast was produced. In the same sense month 1 stands for December 2007.
The vertical axis measures the forecast error.
As already stated, the graphs describe each year of the panel by three
lines. The upper line corresponds to the mean plus one standard deviation,
and the lower line to the mean minus one standard deviation. The one in
the middle is the mean itself.
3.4 Analysing the statistics summary
From the graphs in figure 3.2, a number of findings can be drawn as well.
• In general, the forecast errors converge versus the end of the 24 month
period against zero. This is not very surprising, as with time more
and more information about the year to forecast becomes available.
But it is far from correct to say that the mean is very close to zero
in the end of each two years. Sometimes the mean forecast errors in
December amount to around half a percentage point. But the extent
to which the forecasters’ mean misses the actual outcome seems to be
quite arbitrary.
• Also very expected is the fact that the standard deviation decreases
over the two years. This comes along with the consideration that the
less information is available at the beginning of the 24- month, the more
uncertain the forecasters are. This yields a higher variability of their
forecasts, and thus the standard deviation is higher. In other words,
over the course of two years of information gathering, the standard
deviation decreases, as seen in the yearly graphs. The mean standard
deviations is shown in figure 3.2 further below in the text.
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3.5 The benchmark
According to a broad accordance in the literature the mean over all forecasts
- the so-called consensus forecast - outperforms in many cases the individual
ones; especially when analysing more than one year. For this reason, this
average forecast naturally serves as the benchmark all later trials of forecast
combinations have to compete with.
As Batchelor [5] points it out in his 2001 study, “Consensus forecasts are
known to be hard to beat. Just as spreading investments over many assets
reduces risk, so averaging forecasts across different forecasters reduces the
size of the expected error, a point first formalized by Bates and Granger [6]
around 40 years ago.” And already 1984 Zarnowitz [22] found that, “the
group mean forecasts from a series of surveys are on average over time more
accurate than most of the individual projections. This is a strong conclu-
sion, which applies to all variables and predictive horizons covered and is
consistent with evidence for different periods from other studies.”
This section analysed the data in a general way. The upcoming section
will take a closer look on the individual forecasters.
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4.1 The obvious question: who is the best
forecaster?
The question of particular interest in this section is, “is there a forecaster or
a group of forecasters who are better than others?” This is still a very vague
formulation for two reasons. What is the definition of “better”, and what
kind of time horizon are we talking about? The former question addresses
the topic of how to measure accuracy. A look into the literature provides us
with a lot of possible measurements. Among those, three error measurements
found broad acceptance in the literature, which we will explain in the next
paragraph. The latter question is concerned with whether the success of a
forecaster was just arbitrary, or a one-time thing, or whether it performed
constantly well over at least a couple of years.
4.2 Error measures
The first conventional error measure is the mean forecast error (MFE), which
is a measure of the overall bias of forecasts.
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MFE(i) =
1
M
M∑
t=1
yt − fi,t (4.1)
where y obviously is the actual outturn of the GDP growth rate. f is
here the forecast for the year in question. t indicates the month, whereas
i represents the individual agency. M is usually 24 because one forecasting
period contains 24 month. In the last section we already introduced the
forecast error and its meaning of over- or underestimating the pace of the
economy. Here, a positive average forecast error may indicate that over the
whole period of observed forecasts the actual values were underestimated,
which made the forecasts too low. On the other hand, a negative one in-
dicates overestimation. As already said the average forecast error measures
the overall bias and is in this sense no measure of accuracy, since a forecaster
could produce large but alternating forecast errors. Although its constant
over- and underestimation cancel each other out in a way that the bias is
zero or close to it, this forecaster is still not a very good one.
The second commonly used error measure is the mean absolute forecast
error (MAFE). It is calculated by averaging all differences between the actual
and the forecast, disregarding the sign of the forecast error. So it does not
matter whether the forecasts were over- or underestimated, but just the
amount of how much the forecast was under- or overestimated.
MAFE(i) =
1
M
M∑
t=1
|yt − fi,t| (4.2)
The implication here is that the mean absolute error evaluates a forecast
error of 2 percentage points twice as seriously as a forecast error of only 1
percentage point.
The third measure used in this study is the mean squared forecast error
(MSFE), which is computed by squaring each forecast error and then taking
the average of them.
24
4.3. The measures used in this study
MSFE(i) =
1
M
M∑
t=1
[yt − fi,t]2 (4.3)
The implicit assumption here is that a forecast error of 2 percentage
points is evaluated as 4 times as serious as a forecast error of only 1 percent-
age point. This in turn means, that the MSFE punishes a couple of heavy
forecast errors much more than a lot of small forecast errors. This also means
that constantly “good” forecasters become better ranked than the so-called
one-timers.
Other error measures which are not used in this work include the scale-
independent mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) which is often de-
ployed when the underlying data is denominated in different units. The root
mean squared error (RMSE) is like the mean squared forecast error with the
difference that it takes the root of the MSFE. Also sometimes found in the
literature is the Theil’s inequality coefficient1 which evaluates the forecasting
performance relative to a benchmark.
4.3 The measures used in this study
In the following part the forecasters are described individually by the follow-
ing criteria:
• Counts, which shows the number of forecasts published. (COUNTS)
• Mean forecast error, which reflects a natural measure of bias. (BIAS)
• Mean squared forecast error, as a first accuracy criterion. (MSFE)
• Mean absolute forecast error, as a second accuracy criterion. (MAFE)
The four next figures are structured in exactly the same way for reasons
of simplicity and comparability. An aggregated view of the measures for
1See Batchelor [5] on Theil’s inequality coefficient
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the 12 observed years are given in columns 2 and 3. In the second column
the criterion is displayed with respect to all 11 years. Column 3 reports the
same as column 2 with the little but maybe insightful difference that the
crisis year 2008 was left out of the consideration for a moment. This has the
advantage to see to which extent the bias or forecasting accuracy criteria are
influenced by a rather extreme year (an extreme year which is supposed to
happen every other decade). In the rest of the columns every single year is
depicted.
Finally the tables are again colour-coded in order to find certain patterns
or outliers easier. Please note that the average forecast was included as
“Benchmark Average”. The “Benchmark Median” was also included in order
to show a possible differences to the the average.
4.3.1 Counts
First, an overview of the forecast counts is given. This has - especially for
the general evaluation and interpretation - quite important implications. As
we will show later, a forecaster may improve its performance also by not
handing in any forecasts. At this point keep in mind what was said in the
beginning about the collection of forecasts: to enter the forecast publication
it is not necessary to have produced updated forecasts. Again, if a forecaster
does not send back any updated figures, the HMT publishes those of the last
month.
When looking at the figure 4.1, remember that at first all forecasters
who had less than 50 forecast were not included in the panel. There are at
least 20 agencies which have almost always published their forecasts. On the
other hand the lower two fifths can not offer more than 200 counts. Twelve
out of those 51 forecasters did not come up with a forecast in 2008 which
most probably means that they ceased to produce forecasts. The table is
colour-coded in the following way: green corresponds to the highest number
of 233 counts; red on the other hand corresponds to 0 counts.
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4.3.2 Mean forecast error
The mean forecast error (MFE) is colour-coded in the same way as “the
blur” from section 2. Just that the lower bound of −2 is colour red and the
upper bound of +2 is coloured blue as the two upper right cells indicate.
For around two thirds of forecasters the forecasts are higher than the
actuals, which we can see with the help of the negative sign of the mean
forecast errors. This corresponds to an upward bias. The other third shows
a downward bias.
With the exception of the two values which show the largest upward
respectively downward bias, all forecasters lie within a range of −0.3 to
+0.3, which we think is quite remarkable. Even further, 28 forecasters lie
in the range from −0.1 to +0.1 MFEs, which actually can be interpreted
as having no bias at all. The highest upward bias by quite a margin is
produced by MacroEcon.com with bias of almost half a percentage point. On
the other end with a downward bias of full 1.2 percentage points, Economic
Perspectives gets the title of the “heavy outlier”, which is defended in almost
all observed years remarkably well. Looking back to figure 3.1 “the blur”
at the beginning of this work the observable blue stripe corresponds to that
agency. Also note, that many of those who have a relatively high or a
relatively low MFE, often have a very small number of underlying counts.
If we compare the second and the third column, we must come to the
conclusion that the year of the crisis 2008 on average decreased the general
upward bias by 0.15 percentage points. Thus, excluding the crisis year 2008,
the pace of the economy was in general underestimated, which makes the
collectivity of forecasters a slight pessimist.
As also mentioned above, the vertical columns for the single years show
the systematic risk of all forecasters having the same underlying information
set. This results in a yearly upward or downward bias.
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4.3.3 Mean squared forecast error
The mean squared forecast error is one of the two accuracy criterions used in
this work and is presented in equation 4.3. Figure 4.3 states the calculated
values of the MSFE for the different agencies in the according years starting
with the best forecaster. Figure 9.2 shows almost the same with the small
difference that the value of the MSFE is shown but its corresponding rank
in the table. Since the ranks refer only to the very same column in which
they are noted, it is easy to tell for each of the stated periods of time who
according to the MSFE criterion was the best forecaster. Thus, figure 4.3
and 9.2 provide a first answer to the initial question. The corresponding
colour-code was assigned in the way that a MSFE of 0 corresponds to green
and a MSFE of 6 corresponds to red.
Williams de Broe leads the tables as best forecaster in terms of the MSFE.
They remain best even when we look at the subset which excludes the year
2008. In this 10-year period the other forecasters are closer to the MSFE
value of Williams de Broe. In other words, they could improve their lead by
simply not forecasting in 2008. That reflects the above foretold point that a
forecaster can improve their performance by not forecasting in difficult years
like in 2008. Although Williams de Broe illustrates the argument quite
clearly, this fact does not imply the imputation that they actually did so in
order to achieve an advantage. Moreover, it shall show that the analysis is
quite sensitive to the years included. So, when compressing information in
a single index like the MSFE, other mechanisms might be at work as well.
This is exactly why figure 4.3 also presents the forecasters’ performance per
year.
Among the next seven best there are five who did not engage in fore-
casting for all years. Only Lombard Street and Daiwa Institute of Research
did so over the whole period of time. In this sense, these two forecasters are
the only ones who beat as an individual forecasting agency the benchmark,
i.e. the simple average over all forecasters. This is quite striking, especially
because in the literature they refer to a “hard to beat” benchmark. On the
other side one could say that among 51 forecasting agencies there might be
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one or two models in action who beat the average forecast. But of course the
next 20 forecasters are in very short range to the benchmark. This becomes
even clearer when we compare the benchmark’s MSFE with its MAFE.
The same table lists at its very bottom - not very surprisingly - Economic
Perspectives again . Their MSFE is by far very bad when compared over the
entire time of 11 years. As already indicated above, we assume some sort of
reason for that behaviour, like they try to niche the forecasting market or
try to maximize publicity since it must be quite hard constantly not to learn
from earlier mistakes.2
On the other hand, Economic Perspectives does provide something like a
lower bound to the realised outcome. For both years of strong general upward
bias, 2001 and 2008, Economic Perspectives still expects, though only by a
bit, a weaker economy than they predicted by their figures. And that is
still true in the case of 2008, which marks the worst economic crisis in the
last eight decades. So we could argue that Economic Perspectives provides
figures for the worst-case scenario. This is also very valuable information in
today’s times. But then this aim should be proclaimed as well.
MacroEcon.com is a good example for how a forecaster’s performance is
ruined by forecasting badly just once, like they did for 2008. But this must
also be mitigated in parts: their one-time mistake can not be absorbed very
well by other years, because they started forecasting as recently as 2004.
1998 and 2007 are those years which are colour-coded the most in green,
indicating that those were the best forecasted years. This is actually only
true for the year 2007, since for 1998 the first nine months of the 24-month
period, which by far are those that contribute most “mass” to the MSFE,
are not included in the data set.
And of course, the worst year - obviously not only in terms of forecasting
- was 2008 when the crisis took us by surprise.
Table 9.2 shows the MSFE as well, just in rankings of it. The only
thing to mention now is that another three columns were included. The col-
2Apparently they use a two-scenario composite model in which one scenario captures
a credit market crash.
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umn labelled “Min” shows the particular forecaster’s best reached position.
“Max” on the other hand reports the worst position taken by that forecaster.
Quite interesting is also the third column “Spread”, because it indicates the
stability or instability of good as well as bad forecasts.
Further information can be drawn from this kind of presentation. For
instance, Daiwa Institute of Research is among the best forecasters because
they produce the most stable forecasts. Over the whole period they only
rank between the 10th and the 29th position. CBI’s spread ranks 2nd best,
thus making it not only a good forecaster but also a very stable one: only
positions from 9 until 32. On the other hand Chase Manhattan provides (on
a four year basis) stable but comparatively bad forecasts (positions between
27 and 45).
The next section analyse the mean absolute forecast error (MAFE). The
structure of the corresponding tables is kept exactly the same.
4.3.4 Mean absolute forecast error
The mean absolute forecast error is the second applied accuracy criterion.
The set-up in the two following table 4.4 as well as the colour-coding is all
the same, except that the highest value of 2 is coloured in red. In figure 9.3
the forecasters’ rankings according to the MAPE criterion are displayed.
As already mentioned in section two, MAFE and MSFE are obviously
different, but show almost the same results. So instead of repeating most
of the findings for the MSFE, we will go on with the comparison of the two
accuracy criteria. For this, see figure 4.5.
4.4 Comparison of MSFE and MAFE
Please note that the second column reports MSFE and the third one MAFE.
Also remember that in the introduction to this section we explained that the
MSFE punishes a few higher forecast errors much more than a forecaster
who produced a lot of small forecasts.
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With that in mind we can analyse table 4.5. There are three different
topics to address.
Firstly, the forecasters who do average under the MSFE criterion but do
much better in the ranking when analysed by MAFE are Goldman Sachs,
NIESR, ITEM Club, and IMF. A possible explanation is that the last three
of them did quite badly in the 2008 forecasts. And since outliers get over
proportionally punished under the MSFE, it is them who win in positions.
Secondly, Merrill Lynch and Moody’s Economy do much better in the
MSFE ranking then in the MAFE. Also here a possible explanation might
be that they did very well in the years when most others did collectively bad.
So while the others did over proportionally collected “mass” to their MSFE
ranking, they did not.
Thirdly, the benchmark drops quite badly from the 9th rank under MSFE
to a 32nd rank under MAFE. This finding, unpleasant as it is, should actually
be expected: since the benchmark is an average over 51 forecasters, there
are no very high or very low values of forecast errors in the data left, just
because they became neutralized by the fact that there are so many (51)
who help bearing the burden. Hence, extreme values which become more
punished under MSFE are, if at all, quite rare. The benchmark is a very
good example to illustrate that many but small mistakes are rewarded more
under the MSFE criterion than a few but huge mistakes.
4.5 Comparison of quarterly MSFE
Figure 4.5below shows the three-month average MSFE by forecaster over all
eight quarters of the two years. This is in contrast to the above tables which
take the average MSFE by years. It is very clear that Williams de Broe in
general predicts very well the true outcome already early in the forecasting
period. In other words, their prediction of the true value of GDP growth is
already in the first quarter quite precise on an average basis. The other green
colour-coded forecasters Bridgewell, Greenwich Natwest, Norwich Union IM
and Primark WEFA only appear to be good forecasters. When seeing the
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of MSFE and MAFE
low number of their forecasts especially in January to March of the year-
ahead forecast, see figure 4.1 “counts”, one has to take into account two other
possibilities of their seemingly good performance. First, they could have been
just lucky or they have presented their forecasts in a very stable economic
environment. This does not mean that they were not good forecasters, but
that other influences may have pushed their rank in this analysis.
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Introduction to forecast
combination
5.1 What is forecast combination?
Most of the times finding out who is the best forecaster is not straight for-
ward. Experience over time is one possibility to determine which forecaster
is the more reliable one. But if the pool of agencies to choose from grows
bigger in number or the performances of individual forecasters are not stable
enough over time to support the decision-making process, experience very
fast turns out to be no possibility any more.
Instead of relying on a single opinion about the future, forecast combi-
nation - as the name says - combines multiple opinions into one which, as
the empiric evidence often shows, provides a very good support to the deci-
sion makers compared to just relying on individual forecasts. Thus, forecast
combination is a tool which helps decision makers assess multiple forecasts
of the same variable.
A first combination method was already introduced in the first part of
this study. The “Benchmark Average” in the tables of the last chapter is per
se a forecast combination since it was calculated by combining all forecasts
with equal weight; here the emphasis lies on the words all and equal.
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However, forecast combination is more than just averaging over all possi-
bilities. It rather tries to exploit the underlying information of the individual
forecasters in a best way. The main idea behind that is the use of diversifi-
cation gains.
Forecast combination originates from the field of financial economics.
Predicting financial data as stock prices, indices or commodity prices better
than potential competitors might gain a company a very powerful tool in its
daily business. For this reason the literature on this topic is quite extensive.
Nevertheless, the next couple of sections will provide insight into the theory
and empirical evidence on forecast combinations. It follows to some extent
the paper of Timmermann [20] which has in contrast to this work a rather
theoretical approach to the topic.
5.2 The idea of forecast combination
As Timmermann [20] and Clements and Harvey [8], as well as many others
point out, the combination of forecasts is motivated by a simple portfolio
diversification argument which was first discussed in this context by Bates
and Granger [6] already in 1969. “The idea is simply that the individual
forecasts are each based on partial, and incompletely overlapping, informa-
tion sets, as might be the case if they reflect private information”1. Thus, “it
is not feasible to pool the underlying information sets and construct a ‘super’
model that nests each of the underlying forecasting models.”2. In this sense,
the underlying idea of forecast combination is to exploit the extra informa-
tion of each forecast in a similar way as the portfolio diversification tries to
minimize risk by spreading the investments over a number of securities.
Another commonly found reason in the literature for the strength of fore-
cast combination methods is best summarized by Timmermann [20]: “indi-
vidual forecasts may be very differently affected by structural breaks caused,
for example, by institutional change or technological developments. Some
1Clements and Harvey [8]
2Timmermann [20]
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models may adapt quickly and will only temporarily be affected by struc-
tural breaks, while others have parameters that only adjust very slowly to
new post-break data. The more data that is available after the most recent
break, the better one might expect stable, slowly adapting models to per-
form relative to fast adapting ones as the parameters of the former are more
precisely estimated. Conversely, if the data window since the most recent
break is short, the faster adapting models can be expected to produce the
best forecasting performance. Since it is typically difficult to detect struc-
tural breaks in ‘real time’, it is plausible that on average, i.e., across periods
with varying degrees of stability, combinations of forecasts from models with
different degrees of adaptability will outperform forecasts from individual
models. This intuition is confirmed in Pesaran and Timmermann (2005).”
A third advantage of forecast combination is that it is more robust against
model misspecification and possible measurement errors in the underlying
data set. By combining forecasts which were produced by different models,
the risk that the chosen forecast model is misspecified is reduced. For further
detail, see again the article of Timmermann [20] in which he refers to a couple
of studies focusing on this issue.
So far, the theoretical considerations about the success of the combination
of forecasts were discussed. But what about the empirical evidence on its
success? The next paragraphs shed some light on this issue. Since there are
different methods of combining forecasts (see chapter 6 for some of them), the
evidence presented right below mostly refers to combination method of the
simple mean. The expressions “simple mean forecaster”, “average forecast”
or “consensus forecast” are used here synonymously.
The evidence on the success of forecast combination is overwhelming as
the following will show. The first paper to look at is Clemen [7] who provides
the first summary on the literature of forecast combination. As he states in
his introduction, “The results have been virtually unanimous: combining
multiple forecasts leads to increased forecast accuracy. This has been the
result whether the forecasts are judgemental or statistical, econometric or
extrapolation. Furthermore, in many cases one can make dramatic perfor-
mance improvements by simply averaging the forecasts.” In his annotated
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bibliography he lists more than 200 articles dealing in a broader sense with
forecast combination. Among those, a lot of articles - without listing them
right here - are in strong favour of an accuracy improvement achieved by
combining forecasts.
Another summarizing study with a much narrower focus on empirical evi-
dence of forecast combination was conducted by Armstrong [3] who surveyed
30 empirical studies. He states that “ in [those] 30 empirical comparisons,
the reduction in ex ante errors for equally weighted combined forecasts aver-
aged about 12.5% and ranged from 3 to 24 percent. Under ideal conditions,
combined forecasts were sometimes more accurate than their most accurate
components.” Further down in his study he rephrases that “Combined fore-
casts are more accurate than the typical component forecast in almost all
situations studied to date. Sometimes the combined forecast will surpass
the best method.” He also gives an overview of the underlying factors which
might modify the extent of the accuracy improvement.
As a last piece of evidence we would like to refer to section 4.3.3 of this
study. In table 4.3 the benchmark which is nothing else than the simple av-
erage over all forecast is among the best. When ruling out all the forecasters
who did not take part over the entire time horizon only Lombard Street and
the Daiwa Institute of Research did slightly better when applying the MSFE
accuracy criterion.
Most of the above mentioned improvements were achieved through sim-
ple combination methods. But there are so many different possibilities to
combine multiple forecasts of the same variable with each other. Thus, a
more detailed differentiation of the methods of combination is required. But
this raises immediately a new question: may there be even further accuracy
improvements when using more complex combination methods?
The next chapter presents different combination methods. While the
first discusses methods which - strictly speaking - do not combine forecasts,
section 6.3 deals with simple ways of combining forecasts and section 6.4 tells
about more advanced possibilities of forecast combinations. Since almost all
the studies and articles - to the knowledge of the author - focus on a particular
41
Chapter 5. Introduction to forecast combination
detail of the combination problem and since a general discussion of the topic
- like in a book - is missing, it shall be noted that the discussion in the next
sections is mainly rooted in the article of Timmermann [20].
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The essential idea behind the different methods to be introduced now is that
“they” all try to be the most accurate forecasting scheme. They differentiate
from each other basically in two aspects. First, a loss function has to be
specified to make the individual forecasts comparable. In chapter 4 two
different loss functions were presented. The first bases on the MAFE whereas
the second one bases on the MSFE. For this study, the MSFE was chosen as
the criterion of accuracy. This rather arbitrary choice can be justified by the
idea that “large errors are proportionally more serious than small”.1 And
the second aspect is that a certain rule has to be chosen which tells about
the weight of each forecast in the combination forecast. From now on this
study is all about possible rules of combining. It also shall be noted right
away that different rules or methods can jointly be applied at the same time.
Or a certain rule can be applied first and then followed by a second one.
Before getting started with a more detailed discussion of the different
schemes, some general notations should be introduced. ω represents a weight.
Thus, ωi stands for the specific weight assigned to forecaster i whereas i
stands for all different forecasters, i = {1, 2, . . . , N} and N indicates the
1see Clements and Hendry [9]. Next to that, Clements and Hendry [9] justify the use
of MSFE by the fact that over- and underestimation have similar costs. Moreover, they
say that the “quadratic function is largely due to mathematical tractability and reflects
the pervasiveness of the least-square principle in the econometrics literature.”
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number of forecasters in the sample. The number of months is indicated by
M which mostly is equal to 24, since for every year to be forecasted there
are 12 year-ahead forecasts and 12 current-year forecast.
Further the reader shall remember that in order to correctly compare the
different methods of combination, the data set is usually split into two parts.
The first part is used to collect information, ωi, about the performance of the
individual forecasters. Then in the second part this information is applied
by producing a combined forecast, ŷt, from the individual forecasts of the
year in question, fi,t, with the help of the collected information, ωi.
For example, we want to produce a combined forecast for the year 2005.
Since we know the performances of the forecasters in 2004, we apply this
information by weighting the new January 2005 forecasts with the year-
2004-based weights. Then for February 2005, and so on, the same is done
until a complete new series of forecasts is created. Done that, the accuracy
of this new combined forecast is again measured by an accuracy criterion.
Since a forecast year contains of 12 year-ahead and 12 current-year ahead
creating the weights and applying them is a bit confusing, a more detailed
discussion is foregone.
Another important information on how the data was processed is that
unlike in many other studies the data was - except for the trimming com-
petition - analysed by years and not on a monthly basis. This means that
the MSFE of a combined forecast is based on 24 forecasts which all have a
different time horizon: a 24-month forecast, a 23-month forecast, ..., and fi-
nally, a one-month forecast. Since all forecasts were treated in the same way,
this approach can be justified. Thus, one has to keep in mind, that months
with a longer forecasting horizon will add more “mass” to the MSFE than
months with a shorter forecasting horizon.
To perfectly confuse the reader we start now with a non-combination
scheme which earned its entry into this comparison through its high degree
of popularity.
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6.1 Non-combination scheme: the naive fore-
cast
In the literature it is often referred to the so-called naive forecast. The main
difference to all the other methods here is that its next year’s prediction is
not based on the performance of earlier forecasters, but simply on this year’s
realization of the variable in question. The naive forecast basically adopts
the idea of the random walk: the best guess for tomorrow is today’s value
plus some uncertainty about it. So basically this method looks at this year’s
realisation of the GDP growth rate and assumes that next year’s growth rate
will stay the same as equation 6.1 shows.2 Note that no individual forecasts,
fi,t, are used to form the prediction.
ŷt+1 = yt (6.1)
where ŷt+1 indicates the “combined” forecast and t represents the year.
Thus, next year’s forecasts is this year’s actual outturn.
6.2 Quasi combination schemes
In this text quasi combination schemes are combinations of forecasts which
assign to only one forecaster a weight of one and to all the other forecasters
a weight of zero. Since this can be translated into simply choosing the best
model or the median model for instance, and no “real” combination happens,
they are called quasi combinations.
6.2.1 Last year’s best
A first combination scheme is the following: the best forecaster of last year
is identified and then this agency’s current-year forecast is taken as the best
guess. This does not sound like a very solid idea, but due to the lack of a
2empiric evidence and references still missing
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publicly available track record we could imagine that this method of fore-
casting is quite common in practice. Especially since agencies might want to
profit from their last year’s good performance and advertise with their sup-
posedly good forecasting skills. As the example of Economic Perspectives
shows, the underlying reason might just be luck. It is left to the reader to
compare the ranking shown in figure 9.1 with the ranking of this study in
figure 9.2.3
6.2.2 Last years’ best
A similar method is identifying the forecaster with the best track record in
the last couple of years. The only difference to the before mentioned strategy
is that not only last year’s performance of the different forecasters is under
evaluation but all years or a rolling window over the last three, five or eight
years is analysed. The forecaster with the best guesses over this enlarged
horizon is identified and then the forecast of this specific forecaster is used
to predict next year’s realisation of the GDP growth rate.
But as Timmermann puts it “choosing the single forecast with the best
track record is often a bad idea”. He refers to a couple of studies which
support this statement. Among them are Makridakis et al [14] as early as
1982, Makridakis and Winkler [15] in 1983, Gupta and Wilton [12]in 1987.
More recent studies reporting the same results are Stock and Watson [18] in
1998 as well as Hendry and Clements [13] in 2002.
6.2.3 Median forecaster
This method identifies the median forecaster and takes its forecast as the
best prediction for the realization of the values in question. Stock and Wat-
son [18] report a huge success of this group of forecast combination methods.
The median forecasters performance is much better than the previous two
3Obviously the rankings are not constructed in the same way. However, the ranking
by the Sunday Times is the only publicly available information about the performance of
forecasters in the UK.
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explained methods and as good as the average forecaster which is explained
next, but was already used several times in this study. In the literature the
method of the median forecaster is mostly labelled as a simple combination
method. Since in the literature there is not yet a formal characterisation
and classification established, the word “simple” here describes more the
fact that it is easy to calculate rather than the affiliation to a certain group
or class of methods. It was classified as a quasi-combination method since it
is based unlike the average forecaster only on one individual forecast, namely
the median forecaster.
6.3 Simple combination schemes
6.3.1 Average forecast
The explanation of this method is straight-forward. Take the average over
all forecasts of the different agencies published in a certain month and you
get the average forecast. Again, this averaging method can also be seen as a
special case of weighting in which each forecaster in the sample is assigned
the weight of one or when the sum of all weights shall result one, the weight
of each forecaster is 1/N where N is the number of forecasters in the sample.
“Simple combination schemes are hard to beat”4. This means that this
actually quite simple method of combining forecasts does often better than
“more sophisticated rules relying on estimating optimal weights that [for
instance] depend on the full variance-covariance matrix of forecast errors”.
Timmermann refers to Palm and Zellner [17] who summarize in general the
advantages of a simple average forecast in the following way. First, the
weights do not have to be estimated. According to their findings, this is a
huge advantage in cases where little evidence on the performance of the fore-
casting agencies is known or in cases with time-varying parameters. Second,
the average reduces the variance and the bias by cancelling out each others
bias. And thirdly, “it will often dominate, in terms of MSE5, forecasts based
4again Timmermann [20]
5which in this study is labelled MSFE
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on optimal weighting.” For a deeper discussion and a theoretical justification
of the advantages of simple averaging methods see Timmermann 2005 and
other studies mentioned in his work.
Due to this method’s outstanding performance in the relevant literature
and its easy way of calculation, we decided to declare this simple averaging
method as the benchmark for this study. The benchmark is then taken to
analyse all further combination schemes for further accuracy improvements.
An explanation why the average forecaster performs so well despite its
simplicity when compared to other more complex models is best summarised
by Stock and Watson’s[18] “ ‘This forecast combination puzzle’ - the repeated
finding that simple combination forecasts outperform sophisticated adaptive
combination methods in empirical applications - is, [as Stock and Watson
think], more likely to be understood in the context of a model in which
there is widespread instability in the performance of individual forecast,
but the instability is sufficiently idiosyncratic that the combination of these
individually unstably performing forecasts can itself be stable.”
6.3.2 Trimming
Trimming is a technique similar to a outlier-reduction rule where forecasters
who show a lower-ranking track record measured by an accuracy criterion
like for instance the MSFE are assigned a weight of zero. Hereby, it does
not matter in which way the other weights are calculated. This means for
instance that before the average is calculated or before the median forecaster
is identified, forecasters are trimmed off, i.e. dropped, from the sample.
Obviously, the rule on which these cancellations base has to be determined,
which hides a certain extent of arbitrariness. For this study, a MSFE-based
ranking was generated and then an increasing amount of forecasters were
dropped. First only the worst two, then as many as are necessary that
remain the best 30, the best 20, the best 10 and finally the best 5 in the
sample.
Empirical evidence is offered by a couple of authors. For instance “Win-
kler and Makridakis [21] find that including very poor models in an equal-
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weighted combination can substantially worsen forecasting performance. Fur-
ther, Stock and Watson6 find that the simplest forecast combination methods
such as trimmed equal weights and slowly moving weights tend to perform
well” as Timmermann [20] describes. He concludes with “trimming of the
worst models often improves performance”.
The extent to which the lower-ranking forecasters are trimmed off has
also been analysed. Granger and Jeon [11] suggest up to ten percent of the
worst models, whereas Aiolfi and Favero [2] favour a much more aggressive
trimming. They found that trimming off up to 80% of the worst models
yield the best performance results.
6.4 Advanced combination schemes
Until now, the weights in the above sections had only two different values:
zero or 1/n; where again n is the number of forecasts to be combined out of
all forecasting agencies N .
Quasi-combination schemes assign the value of one only to a single fore-
caster’s weight whereas the remaining forecasters N −n, with n = 1, get the
weight of zero. In the case of the average forecast, every forecaster out of all
N forecasters get the same weight of 1/n with n = N , whereas in trimming
schemes the weights depend on how many forecasters n are chosen to be
combined out of all agencies N . That means the non-zero weights ωi depend
on the degree of trimming: ωi = 1/n with n = 1, 2, ..., N .
In this section now more than two (0 or 1/n) different values of weights
are allowed. The determination of the value of the individual weight can be
based on several methods. A first way was already implicitly introduced,
when the ranking-based7 trimming method was explained. The drawback
of using the rank is that it does not use all available information because it
only asks whether a forecaster is better than another and not for how much
a forecaster is better than the other. A second way which uses all available
6Stock and Watson [19] cited in Timmermann
7a ranking based on an accuracy criterion like the MSFE or the MAFE
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information, is introduced in the next subsection.
Other methods like the minimisation of the summed MSFE, exponen-
tial smoothing and a time-discounted method will also be explained in this
section.
6.4.1 Inverse MSFE
A first more advanced strategy is that the forecasts are weighted by their
inverse MSFE. Since the better forecasting agencies should have a lower
mean squared forecast error, weighting them with their inverse MSFE, makes
their guess more dominant in a combination of forecasts. Thus the weight
of forecaster i is determined by the relation of its inverse MSFE to the sum
of the inverse MSFEs of all forecasters, as equation 6.2 points out.
ωi =
[MSFE(i)]−1∑N
i=1[MSFE(i)]
−1 (6.2)
According to Stock and Watson [18], this combination scheme belongs
to those ones, next to the median and the average forecast, which show em-
pirically strong evidence of improved accuracy. Similarly, in a time-series
simulation experiment, Winkler and Makridakis [21] find that a “weighted
average with weights inversely proportional to the sum of squared errors or a
weighted average with weights that depend on the exponentially discounted
sum of squared errors perform better than the best individual forecasting
model, equal-weighting or methods that require estimation of the full covari-
ance matrix for the forecast errors.”8
6.4.2 MSFE minimisation
This combination scheme assigns different weights to forecasts by giving
those a higher weight which according to an accuracy criterion like the MSFE
are most accurate. This method involves solving an optimization problem.
8in Timmermann [20]
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In short, this method searches for a specific set of weights for which the
forecasts produce the smallest MSFE when calculated over the respective
time of information gathering. This is done by the following recipe which is
demonstrated for the year 2008 in the case of a one-year rolling window. In
this case, the weights for 2008 are calculated by looking on the performance of
the forecasters in 2007. In the case of a three-year rolling window, obviously
we need to look at the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Thus in the one-year rolling
window, the weights are calculated by solving the following minimization
problem: for which weights is the MSFE of 2007 minimised? This is done
by solving problem 6.3.
min
ωi,t
1
M
M∑
t=1
[
yt −
N∑
i=1
fi,tωi,t
]2
(6.3)
where again ωi represents the weight respective a forecasting agency i ∈
N , t ∈M stands for the month which total up to M = 24. Since we just look
at a one-year rolling window, in this case the year 2007, there is no need to
make the minimisation equation more complicated. Once, a solution for all
ωi is found, the combination of the forecasts to a new “combined” forecast
can be done. For this, the weights ωi are multiplied with their corresponding
forecasts from the year 2008. This is done in equation 6.4, where h = 24
since we combine the forecasts for 2008 based on the information we gathered
for the year 2007.
ŷt+h = ω1,tf1,t+h + ω2,tf2,t+h + . . .+ ωN,fN,t+h (6.4)
By doing this for all months t+h, we get a series of 24 combined forecasts,
ŷt+h, for the year 2008. After taking the MSFE, its accuracy can be compared
to all other combination schemes, by taking the MSFE(ŷt+h):
MSFE(ŷt+h) =
1
M
M∑
t=1
[yt+h − ŷt+h]2 (6.5)
Usually, one would have to wait a year until that out-of sample year’s
true outturn is available. Again, all numbers produced here are constructed
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from the point of view of the year in question.
Since these optimisation problems were derived from the regression prob-
lems as in Timmermann [20] or Clements and Harvey [8], there is little ev-
idence on the performance of these minimisation methods. Following their
logic, there are three different cases to differentiate. Until here the weights
ωi are unconstrained. That means they do not necessarily add up to one and
most probably are not positive for all ωi. Thus, there is the possibility to
impose a constraint such that all weights ωi sum up to one, as it was done
in equation 6.6.
min
ωi,t
1
M
M∑
t=1
[
yt −
N∑
i=1
fi,tωi,t
]2
(6.6)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ωi,t = 1
Since this still does not imply that all weights ωi are positive or at least
0, a second constraint can be introduced, as in the following equation 6.7
min
ωi,t
1
M
M∑
t=1
[
yt −
N∑
i=1
fi,tωi,t
]2
(6.7)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ωi,t = 1
and s.t. ωi,t ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
In the above case a rolling window of one year was assumed. Of course,
there can be different specifications as for instance a three-year rolling win-
dow or a recursive algorithm, i.e. an ever expanding window, which never
“forgets”. These kind of considerations will be discussed in the next subsec-
tion.
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6.4.3 Time-varying combination schemes
In order to construct weights one has consider about which information to
use. In trimming schemes certain information was neglected, i.e. certain
forecasters were cut out of the sample. Another issue is the time horizon on
which a certain decision is made. Do I only consider the forecasters’ perfor-
mance in the last year? Or in the last three years? Or do I base my decision
on all the information that is available to me, i.e. on all available years?
Apart from this decision a different kind of time-varying combinations can
be thought off: they summarize under the term of exponential smoothing.
This is a technique which gives - independently on the number of years in
consideration - more weight on recent years then on years which passed some
more time ago.
Empirical evidence on this topic is best summarized by Timmermann’s [20]
“Limited time-variation in the combination my be helpful”. He mentions
a couple of studies, among those are Bates and Granger [6], Winkler and
Makridakis [21] and Newbold and Granger [16], which all tend to result in
favour of a longer rolling window length. Results are contradicting in the
case of exponential smoothing methods. Whereas Bates and Granger prefer
a stronger emphasis on recent years, Winkler and Makridakis find evidence
for a relatively low value of the discount factor.
Whereas smoothing methods will not be discussed in this study, time-
variation is applied for most cases in form of a comparison of a one-year
rolling window, a three-year rolling window and a recursive, i.e. expanding,
window.
6.4.4 Uncertainty-discounted methods
This method is - at least to the author’s knowledge - a novelty to the liter-
ature of forecast combination. Figure 6.1 on page 54 shows that over the
horizon of 24 month the standard deviation is decreasing from a value of
about 0.5 in the January year-ahead forecast to a value of under 0.2 in the
current-year December forecast. This is nothing new and not at all different
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Figure 6.1: Average Standard Deviation (1998-2008)
to what is expected. It simply shows that the more information is available
the more certain are the different forecasting agencies about the true out-
come of the GDP growth rate. The novelty now is that when calculating the
weights of each forecaster the original forecasts are multiplied by a certain
factor λ which takes the uncertainty of earlier forecasts into account. This
λ for instance could be generated by the following rule:
λ =
SD of month
SD of last month
(6.8)
This would mean that in January of the year-ahead forecast the multiplier
λ is around 3 since λ = 0.51
0.16
≈ 3. Obviously the λ for the last month is 1.
Thus, the multiplier would be between 3 and 1. The effect of this procedure
is the following. We already know that the earlier a forecast is published the
more uncertainty there is about its correctness. Thus, a forecaster who is
very good in predicting more close to the realisation should be rewarded for
doing so. On the other hand, a forecaster being far away from the “truth”
should be punished. This mechanism is implemented by multiplying the
forecasts with their month-specific uncertainty, expressed by λ. In the end,
the better “early forecasters” get assigned a much lower MSFE than in the
case without a multiplier.
Since a more detailed evaluation of this method would go beyond the
scope of this work, it will not further be discussed. A future study will
exclusively discuss this issue.
Other combination methods and methods for calculating the weights are
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of course existent. For example, estimating the weights via a regression.
The literature reports a lot of mixed results on that topic along with some
more severe difficulties concerning the application of an estimation. In this
context, the combination method of shrinkage is mentioned from time to
time. Nevertheless, these two issues are not discussed in this work. The
interested reader is, thus, referred to the literature of Timmermann [20] and
Clements and Harvey [8].
Also not included in this work is the more recent line of research of
“forecast encompassing”. For the newest developments on this issue, the
reader is referred to Costantini and Kunst [10].
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Applied forecast combination
Is the benchmark really as hard to beat as Timmermann [20] and other
studies claim? Are their findings robust enough to be applied also to this
particular work?
After having explained the main methods of combining forecasts in the
foregone chapter, this final chapter shows the results of the forecast combi-
nation which is based on this work’s data set.
7.1 The output tables
In figure 7.1 the performance of five different combination schemes are dis-
played. Three of them were introduced in section 6.2 in which the so-called
“quasi”-combinations are explained. A fourth scheme is very similar to the
method of the “Last Year’s Best”, just that it tries to identify the best fore-
caster based on all past years in the data set and not only on the last year
or on the last three years. The fifth method is the average forecast, i.e. the
benchmark which is to beat.
In order to understand how to read this as well as the following output
tables, figure 7.1 will be explained in more detail. Most important fact to
remember is that the numbers for each year were calculated out-of-sample,
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Figure 7.1: Performance of quasi- and simple combination schemes
i.e. from the point of view of each particular single year1. This means that in
the year 2002 we know which forecasting agency was the best in 2001. Thus,
the MSFE of 1.099 (first column,first row) was formed by first identifying
the best forecaster of 2001, and then taking this particular agency’s forecast
as the forecast for 2002. The number 1.099 then represents this forecaster’s
performance measured by the MSFE accuracy criterion. The next number
for instance is not available. The reason for this is that in the year 2002
no full three years of information gathering was possible since the data for
1998 are not fully available to calculate a MSFE on the basis of a three-year
window. In the third row however, the rule on which the information is
evaluated is defined by taking all past possible information. Thus, it does
not really matter that the year 1998 is not complete.2
For the column of 2008, only the information in 2007 was used to identify
the last year’s best performer. For the best performer in the last three years,
obviously the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 were evaluated. And for the best
performer since September 1997 - the start date of the data set - all years
were used to identify the best forecaster. Then for all the three methods
the forecasts from 2008 were taken to be measured by an accuracy criterion.
1To be more precise, the numbers represent the point of view of the end of each year.
2Remember the data set starts with the year-ahead forecast in September 1997 and
not in January 1997
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And finally they here got listed in this table.
The remaining two methods use by definition different information than
the above explained schemes. In June 2008 for example, the median fore-
casting method identifies the median of all individual forecasts published in
June 2008 and takes this value as the forecast for 2008. Then an evaluation
of the accuracy follows exactly in the same way as for the other schemes.
For the average the respective mechanism is true.
And finally the last column summarizes the accuracy performance of
all five methods over the whole period. Thus, the last column tells about
which method is performing better than the others in the long run, or, out
differently, is not based on luck. In other words, this column tells about how
to handle the available information in order to have a good prediction about
the next realisation of the real UK GDP growth rate.
7.2 Competition of quasi- and simple combi-
nation schemes
Since now it should be clear how to read the table, the initial question ac-
tually can be answered. Thus, in a competition of the above five explained
(quasi)-combination methods in figure 7.1, the average forecast - the bench-
mark in this study - is not beaten. The overall3 MSFE of the averaging
method is, although to a small extent, the smallest. The best performer in
all available years and the median forecaster share a close, but second place.
Now the yearly consideration pays off, since it can be shown that out of the
seven years, it was once the best method and another four times missed the
first place by just a little. In the other years it performed quite well. Also,
it is very clear that by simply relying on the last year’s best forecaster is not
really a good choice. This method is almost five out of seven years the worst
adviser; and this to quite an extent.
These findings are very much in line with the empirical evidence of other
3the last column which summarizes the accuracy performance
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studies. Another empirical fact can also be confirmed by this work. As
mentioned in subsection 6.4.3 time-varying models with a longer rolling win-
dow length tend to perform better. This is also true for this competition.
Whereas a rolling window of one year performs quite poorly, a window of
length three performs better, but not as good as a forecasting method which
incorporates all available information.
7.3 Competition of trimming schemes
The produced empirical evidence respective the trimming schemes is exten-
sive as tables 9.4 till 9.7 on page 70 show. In this trimming competition
a new dimension of comparison4 is also introduced and then evaluated in
figure 9.8. But more on that later.
Figure 7.2 which is taken from the lower part of figure 9.5 is presented
here to serve the purpose of demonstration. For a full comparison, find the
tables in the appendix.
Figure 7.2: Trimming competition, exemplarily
The first row shows the average forecaster, the benchmark, accompanied
by the median forecaster. These two lines are in fact row five and four,
4indicated by the “Y” or the “M” at the beginning of each line
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respectively, of the above figure 7.1 which showed the results of the quasi-
and simple combination competition.
In figure 7.2, as an example, the case of a rolling window with a length
of one year is shown. Thus, the performance of the forecasters were ranked
according to the MSFE accuracy criterion always on a year-before-displayed
basis. In rows 3 and 4 then, the worst two forecasters were eliminated which
shall be indicated by the notation of best“-2”. In lines 5 to 10 the sample
is further reduced until in the last two lines only the best five forecasters
based on last year’s information remain. Then their forecasts were averaged
(or the median was taken), after that the accuracy was measured and finally
displayed according to the years indicated in the table. The last column
again summarizes the accuracy performance over the entire evaluated period
of time.
As a first finding of figure 7.2 it should be said that the benchmark
again was not beaten by any of the trimming methods when evaluated over
the whole 7-year period. This is quite impressive. Secondly, the higher the
extent of the trimming, the lower its overall accuracy, even though the “Data
Median Best05” appears to work not as bad as others. And as a last finding
of this table, we can state that their is no clear superiority of neither the
average forecast nor the median forecast.
Now, the findings of tables 9.4 and 9.5 are summarized which were placed
in the appendix on page 70 for reasons of space. Notice, that these two tables
show exactly the same numbers, but are differently colour-coded. The first
table 9.4 is colour-coded in a way that it supports a visual comparison of the
three blocks of each table which differ by the length of the rolling window:
in the upper panel information was gathered only in the last respective year,
in the middle panel a three-years rolling window was applied and in the
lower panel the underlying method was a expanding window. The second
table 9.5 emphasises a visual comparison within of each block which means
that it compares the different methods based on the extent of trimming.
Here are the findings of the tables 9.4 and 9.5:
• From the first table (figure 9.4) we can see that the methods that
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have a longer horizon (lower panel) for determining the ranking - on
which the trimming decision is based - perform better since the MSFE
for these methods are mostly smaller than in the upper or the middle
panel. Thus, these results confirm again the empirical findings of other
studies.
• The second table (figure 9.5) leads us to the conclusion that trimming
off either works when done only slightly or done quite extensively. In
between those extremes, there seems to be evidence, that trimming
performs not that good. This finding actually confirms the contrary
opinion of other studies on this issue as pointed out in the last para-
graph of subsection 6.3.2 on page 48.
• But - and here comes the “but” - the benchmark is beaten by the
“Best05” specification in the case of an expanding window.
• There is no clear evidence that the median or the average forecaster is
superior. Very often their values do not differ much from each other.
The next two tables 9.6 and 9.7 introduce a new dimension of comparison
which is indicated by the “M”, instead of the “Y”, in front of each line. “Y”
stands for the yearly calculation of the MSFE. This means that all forecasts
for one year of a specific agency are evaluated by the MSFE. This way may
neglect the fact that forecasts with different horizons are evaluated with the
same criterion. But as explained in earlier chapters, this does not affect
the aim of this study since all forecasting agencies are treated in the same
way. Still it was interesting to see what happens when the construction
of the rankings are based on a monthly comparison similar to figure 4.6
on page 37. This means for the three-year rolling window that for every
forecaster all three January year-ahead forecasts were evaluated and ranked.
Then the same is done for all of those in February of the year-ahead, and so
on, until all 24 months are finished. After that, it was decided on a monthly
basis who are the best 5, 10, 20 and so on forecasters. On this information
then the forecasts were combined.
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The findings in the tables 9.6 and 9.7 are different to those in the first
two tables:
• On the one hand longer horizons seem again to beat shorter horizons.
• But on the other hand extensive trimming performs uniformly worse.
• None of those specifications is able to beat the benchmark.
The question now is only which of those two ways of constructing the
rankings is better? Table 9.8 shows a direct comparison of every method
involved. The figures in that table were calculated by taking the MSFE of
the monthly rankings and subtracting from that the MSFE generated by the
yearly rankings which is also indicated by “M-Y” at the beginning of each
line. Since the majority of the figures are above zero, we must conclude that
the monthly MSFEs are slightly higher than those based on years. In other
words, the yearly based rankings produce better combined forecasts.
7.4 MSFE minimisation
A last competition was conducted. As explained in the subsection 6.4.2 on
page 50, it was tried to minimize the MSFE via an optimisation process.
The weights of the individual agencies were chosen in a way that they min-
imise the MSFE subject to the entire time period of information gathering.
Within the already well known differentiation into a one-year rolling window,
a three-year rolling window and ever expanding window, the weights were
also formed by constraining them in three different ways. First, there is no
constraint applied. In the second type the sum of all weights have to add up
to 1 and in the third one the weights are not only forced to add up to 1, but
also to be all positive. For further detail recall equations 6.3, 6.6 and 6.7.
The first line of all three blocks show again the average forecaster as
the benchmark. Notice that its figures are not exactly the same as in the
two competitions before since the data sample was slightly modified: blanks
62
7.4. MSFE minimisation
Figure 7.3: MSFE minimisation competition
were filled up and agencies with less than 200 out of 240 data points were
dropped.
A first obvious finding is that in the case of unconstrained weights and
weights which only have to add up to 1, the overall MSFEs are clearly higher.
Further, the benchmark is not beaten. When it comes to the comparison
of the weights it can be seen: the ones with an expanding window performs
best, followed by the three-year rolling window which make the one-year
rolling window again the worst performer.
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Conclusion
Forecast evaluation
This study started with an evaluation of the forecasters’ ability to predict
accurately this year’s and next year’s UK real GDP growth rate. Only two
agencies out of a total of 51 were able to beat the “consensus” forecast which
is the simple average of all forecasts. Quite striking, but conforming to the
empirical evidence, the average forecaster as well as the median forecaster
perform very good.
Forecast combination
The second part of this study looks for methods of combining the individual
forecasters in a way that leads to better forecasts than the average forecaster.
Finally, a small summary about the findings of combination of forecasts is
shown:
• The simple average was just once beaten accuracy-wise by another
combination method.
• Relying on the last year’s or the last three year’s best forecaster is not
a good idea.
• The median forecaster seems to be - to a very small extent - not as
64
good as the average forecaster. But the distance between them is so
small that we must say they are equally performing very good.
• Trimming is performing well when done either only slightly or to a very
high extent. In only one case, trimming has beaten the benchmark.
• The longer the horizon to gather information the better are the com-
bined forecasts. Thus, an ever expanding window is better than a
three-years rolling window which is in turn better than a one-year
rolling window.
• Minimising the MSFE by changing the weights of the individual fore-
casters performs quite poorly except in the situation where the weights
are constrained to sum up to one and have to be all positive. But still,
that methods is not as good as the benchmark.
Thus, most findings confirm the empirical evidence of other studies.
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Figure 9.1: Best Forecaster 2008, Source: Sunday Times Dezember 2008
Figure 9.2: Ranking of forecasters according to the MSFE accuracy criterion
Figure 9.3: Ranking of forecasters according to the MAFE accuracy criterion
Figure 9.4: Trimming: comparison of the window length (yearly based)
Figure 9.5: Trimming: comparison of extent of trimming (yearly based)
Figure 9.6: Trimming: comparison of window length (monthly based)
Figure 9.7: Trimming: comparison of extent of trimming (monthly based)
Figure 9.8: Trimming competition: monthly-based vs. yearly-based
Figure 9.9: List of agencies
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Abstract
This work is divided in two parts. A first part concentrates on the evalu-
ation of the forecast accuracy of around 50 agencies respective the forecasts
of UK GDP growth rates in the last eleven years. For this goal, around 130
publications of “Forecasts for the UK economy” from the HM treasury were
assembled in order to construct a usable data set. The individual forecasts
are then used in a second part to generate combined forecasts according
to the forecast combination literature. Different combination schemes are
applied and compared with each other. The findings mainly confirm the
evidence of comparable empirical studies.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit ist zweigeteilt. Im ersten Teil werden Institute, die sich
an der Prognose zentraler, o¨konomischer Kennzahlen beteiligen, auf ihre
Prognosegenauigkeit hin untersucht. Zu diesem Zweck wurde ein Daten-
satz erstellt, der BIP-Prognosen fu¨r Großbritannien von ca. 50 verschiede-
nen Instituten u¨ber die letzten 11 Jahre zusammenfasst. Grundlage dieses
Datensatzes sind 130 Vero¨ffentlichungen des britischen Finanzministeriums
(HMT). Im zweiten Teil wird durch Kombinationen dieser Prognosen ver-
sucht, den tatsa¨chlichen Wert noch genauer vorherzusagen. Um dieses Ziel
zu erreichen, werden verschiedene Methoden angewandt und miteinander
verglichen. Die Ergebnisse besta¨tigen gro¨ßtenteils die empirischen Befunde
anderer Arbeiten.
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